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Abstract
We discuss a class of copula-based ordered probit models with endogenous switching. Such
models can be useful for the analysis of self-selection in subjective well-being equations in general,
and job satisfaction in particular, where assignment of regressors may be endogenous rather than
random, resulting from individual maximization of well-being. In an application to public and
private sector job satisfaction, and using data on male workers from the German Socio-Economic
Panel for 2004, and using two alternative copula functions for dependence, we find consistent
evidence for endogenous sector selection.
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1 Introduction
The distinction between public and private sector employment conditions has generated a sizeable
literature in empirical labor economics, the largest part of which has studied the wage structure in
the two sectors. A key concern for any study in this area is the potential non-random selection of
workers into sectors which renders the comparison of outcomes for public sector workers and private
sector workers uninformative for the causal effect of sector affiliation on wages. The resulting
endogeneity problem has been addressed in one of two ways, either by following workers over time
and including fixed individual effects (e.g. Pedersen at al., 1990), or by specifying a switching
regression model for cross-sectional data (e.g. van der Gaag and Vijverberg, 1988, Zweimu¨ller and
Winter-Ebmer, 1994, Dustmann and van Soest, 1998).
Both strategies have been borrowed in more recent studies that consider job satisfaction, rather
than wages, as the outcome variable of interest. For example, Heywood et al. (2002) use panel data
from the British Household Panel Study and conclude that public sector workers are “positively
selected”, meaning that the public sector attracts worker who are more easily satisfied anyway. If
the sorting of workers is driven by idiosyncratic gains from being in one sector rather than the
other, however, such fixed effects models are inappropriate. The switching regression approach
allows for selection effects driven by relative gains in job satisfaction. This is a likely scenario if
workers are heterogeneous in their preferences for job attributes offered in the two sectors.
Nevertheless, previous implementations for job satisfaction have been rare. This may be due to
the fact that standard switching regression models are tailored to a continuous dependent variables,
whereas job satisfaction is a discrete and ordered outcome. Asiedu and Folmer (2006) use a two
step approach where regressors in an ordered probit model for job satisfaction in each sector are
augmented by a predicted inverse Mills ratio. McCausland et al. (2005) disregard the discreteness
of the job satisfaction response and use a standard linear model.
The alternative followed in this paper is to specify a linear switching regression for latent
continuous outcomes, and specify a threshold mechanism that translates the latent model into
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corresponding discrete ordered response probabilities. If the stochastic errors in the latent model are
jointly normal distributed, a multivariate ordered probit model results (e.g. Greene and Hensher,
2008, Munkin and Trivedi, 2008; the frequently used bivariate probit model is a special case). We
show, how alternative dependence structures can be modeled in a copula framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section develops the essential elements
of a switching-regression model for job satisfaction. Section 3 introduces copulas as a natural
characterization of dependence in such a switching regression model. The general likelihood function
is derived, and three specific cases are considered: independence copula, normal copula, and Frank’s
copula. Section 4 applies the copula method to job satisfaction of public and private sector workers.
Tests show that the Frank copula dominates the other models in this application. Falsely ignoring
self-selection means that the effect of sector allocation on job satisfaction is underestimated. Section
5 concludes.
2 Modeling self-selection in job satisfaction
When studying subjective well-being and its domains, including job satisfaction, self-selection arises
naturally, since one can expect rational individuals to choose their life circumstances with a view
towards maximizing well-being. This has to be recognized when attempting to estimate the effect
of a choice variable on satisfaction. In this paper, we consider the choice between public and private
sector employment, and its effect on job satisfaction.
Let Ui(1) be the job satisfaction of a person working in sector 1, the public sector, while
Ui(0) is the job satisfaction of the same worker while working in sector 0, the private sector. By
construction, one of the two outcomes is unobservable. For public sector workers, we can observe
Ui(1) but not Ui(0), and vice versa for private sector workers. Hence, the public-private sector job
satisfaction differential for worker i, Ui(1)− Ui(0), is unidentified. In principle, we can attempt to
identify population averages, such as E[Ui(1)− Ui(0)] (the average treatment effect).
Assume that people choose the sector where they expect to be most satisfied, and that their
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expectations are fulfilled. The realized sector is denoted by s ∈ {0, 1}, where si = 0 means that
worker i works in the private sector, and sj = 1 means that worker j works in the public sector.
Under the above assumption, si = 0 if and only if Ui(1) < Ui(0) and sj = 1 if and only if
Uj(1) > Uj(0). As a consequence, we can identify E[Ui(1)|Ui(1) > Ui(0)], but, without further
assumptions, not E[Ui(1)]. Similarly, we can identify E[Ui(0)|Ui(1) < Ui(0)], but not E[Ui(0)].
Ignoring this issue leads to selection bias. For example, the coefficient of a sector 1 dummy variable
in a regression model will not typically estimate the average treatment effect as defined above.
A switching regression model of job satisfaction
One possible set of assumptions that enable estimation of the effect of sector on job satisfaction,
while controlling for a number of explanatory variables, is offered by the standard switching regres-
sion model which can be adjusted in order to account for the discrete and ordered response, job
satisfaction. Let
y∗0 = x
′β0 + ε0 (1)
be the latent job satisfaction index if s = 0, and
y∗1 = x
′β1 + ε1 (2)
be the latent job satisfaction index if s = 1. x is a vector of explanatory variables that is the same
in both equations, and β0, β1 are conformable sector-specific parameter vectors. We do not impose
that β0 = β1, i.e., the regression coefficients may be sector-specific. Workers are observed either in
sector s = 1 or in sector s = 0, but never in both at the same point in time. It is unreasonable to
assume that workers select themselves randomly into the sectors. Rather, it is likely that there is
self-selection based on idiosyncratic gains to job satisfaction due to preference heterogeneity. For
example, workers who gain most from being in the public sector are actually the ones choosing
s = 1 with highest probability. Selection is captured by a third latent equation,
s∗ = z′γ + ν (3)
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and
s =

1 if s∗ ≥ 0
0 if else
(4)
Usually, in this kind of model, z includes a number of instruments in addition to x. The reason x
should be a subset of z is that x affects sector-specific job satisfaction which is likely to be a factor
in determining a person’s sectoral choice. Exclusion restrictions are required in order to identify
the model in other ways rather than through functional form assumptions on the error term only.
The observation mechanism is completed by accounting for the discrete and ordinal scale of
observed job satisfaction. In particular, we follow standard practice and assume a threshold obser-
vation mechanism, whereby
ys =
J∑
j=0
1(y∗s > κs,j), s = 0, 1
and κs,0 = −∞ < κs,1 < . . . < κs,J = ∞ partition the real line (i.e. ys = j if and only if
κs,j−1 < y∗s ≤ κs,j , j = 1, 2, . . . J). This is not a standard ordered response model since ys is only
partially observed. Observed job satisfaction is obtained as
y = y1−s0 y
s
1
Based on the latent model structure, the probabilities of observed private and public sector job
satisfaction can be written as
P (y0 = j, s = 0|x, z) = P (κ0,j−1 − x′β0 < ε0 ≤ κ0,j − x′β0, ν ≤ −z′γ)
= P (ε0 < κ0,j − x′β0, ν ≤ −z′γ)− P (ε0 < κ0,j−1 − x′β0, ν ≤ −z′γ) (5)
and
P (y1 = j, s = 1|x, z) = P (κ1,j−1 − x′β1 < ε1 ≤ κ1,j − x′β1, ν > −z′γ)
= P (ε1 < κ1,j − x′β1)− P (ε1 < κ1,j−1 − x′β1) (6)
−P (ε1 < κ1,j − x′β1, ν ≤ −z′γ) + P (ε1 < κ1,j−1 − x′β1, ν ≤ −z′γ)
4
In this model, the absence of self-selection is equivalent to statistical independence of ν and
ε0 and ε1, respectively. With independence, the joint probabilities can be factored into their
marginals, and one obtains univariate ordered and binary response models. The nature of self-
selection, if present, correspondingly hinges on the joint distributions f(ν, ε0) and f(ν, ε1). For
example, if ν and ε0, and ν and ε1, are bivariate normally distributed, with correlations ρ0 and ρ1,
respectively, the model has a multivariate ordered probit structure (where the correlation between
ε0 and ε1 is unidentified). The marginal models for sector specific job satisfaction are ordered
probits, and the selection model is a binary probit.
But even if one wants to keep probit marginals for all three equations, the two joint distributions
do not need to be bivariate normal. We suggest to combine the outlined switching regression model
with a copula approach for generating joint distribution functions for given marginals. In this way,
we can potentially specify many ordered probit models with endogenous switching in a unified
framework.
Copulas have been used in econometrics before but, to the best of our knowledge, so far not
in the present context of ordered responses. A brief history and overview of the technique is given
in the next section, before we return to the specific implementation of a model for job satisfaction
under self-selection.
3 Modeling selection using copulas
Copulas offer a particular representation of arbitrary joint distribution functions, with the key
property being that the specification of the marginal distributions and the dependence structure is
“uncoupled”. The earliest copula use in econometrics was Lee (1983) who suggested, in the context
of the sample selection model, to use a bivariate normal copula (more in this below) for generating
dependence between two continuous random variables, one with normal marginal (the continuous
outcome variable) and one with logistic distribution (the error in the latent selection equation).
The first econometric applications to discrete outcomes were provided by van Ophem (1999, 2000)
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who used a bivariate normal copula to generate joint distributions for two random variables with
Poisson/Poisson and Poisson/normal marginals, respectively.
The systematic consideration of non-normal copulas started with Smith (2003) who specified
eight different copulas for normal/normal and normal/gamma marginals. Further contributions
in this area include Smith (2005) who used five different copulas in a switching regression model
for continuous outcomes, and Zimmer and Trivedi (2006) who used the Frank copula for negative
binomial/normal marginals. An introduction to the copula method for empirical economists is
provided by Trivedi and Zimmer (2007), see also Nelson (2006).
In statistics, a 2-copula is a bivariate joint distribution function defined on the 2-dimensional
unit cube [0, 1] such that both marginal distributions are uniform on the interval [0, 1]. For example,
the normal, or Gaussian, family of copulas, for n = 2, is
P (U ≤ u, V ≤ v) = C(u, v) = Φ2(Φ−1(u),Φ−1(v); ρ) (7)
where Φ and Φ2 are the uni- and bivariate cdf of the standard normal distribution, and −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1
is the coefficient of correlation. Another example is the Frank family of copulas
C(u, v) = −θ−1 log
{
1 +
(e−θu − 1)(e−θv − 1)
(e−θ − 1)
}
−∞ < θ <∞ (8)
A comprehensive summary of copulas is provided by Nelson (2006). The marginal distributions
implied by bivariate copulas are
F (u) = P (U ≤ u, V ≤ 1) = C(u, 1)
and
F (v) = P (U ≤ 1, V ≤ v) = C(1, v)
respectively. It is easy to verify that all three copulas have the key property that their marginal
distributions are uniform, as C(u, 1) = u and C(1, v) = v.
The significance of copulas lies in the fact that by way of transformation, any joint distribution
function can be expressed as a copula applied to the marginal distributions. This result is due
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to Sklar (1959). Sklar’s theorem states that given a joint distribution function F (y1, . . . , yk), and
respective marginal distribution functions, there exists a copula C such that the copula binds the
margins to give the joint distribution.
For the bivariate case, Sklar’s theorem can be stated as follows. For any bivariate distribu-
tion function F (y1, y2), let F1(y1) = F (y1,∞) and F2(y2) = F (∞, y2) be the univariate marginal
probability distribution functions. Then there exists a copula C such that
F (y1, y2) = C(F1(y1), F2(y2))
Moreover, if the marginal distributions are continuous, the copula function C is unique. We see,
that the copula is now expressed as a function of cdf’s. But cdf’s are uniformly distributed over the
interval [0, 1]. Since the marginal distributions of a copula are uniform, it follows that the marginal
distributions of y1 = F−11 (u) and y2 = F
−1
2 (v) are F1 and F2, as stated.
The practical significance of copula functions in empirical modeling stems from the fact that
they can be used to build new multivariate models for given univariate marginal component cdf’s.
If the bivariate cdf F (y1, y2) is unknown, but the univariate marginal cdf’s are of known form,
then one can choose a copula function and thereby generate an approximation to the unknown
joint distribution function. The key is that this copula function introduces dependence, captured
by additional parameter(s), between the two random variables (unless the independence copula
C(u, v) = uv is chosen). The degree and type of dependence depends on the choice of copula
family as well as the parameters. For our purposes, it is essential that the copula allows for positive
and negative correlation, since we do not want to restrict the selection pattern a priori: we want
to learn from the data whether workers observed in sector 1 are more, less or equally satisfied in
comparison to a randomly selected worker in that sector, ceteris paribus, i.e., for a given set of
explanatory variables.
We consider three copula functions in the following application, the normal copula, the Frank
copula, and the independence copula C(u, v) = uv. In the normal case, −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, with −1
signifying perfect negative correlation, 0 signifying independence, and +1 signifying perfect posi-
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tive correlation. Since copulas in general do not impose linear dependence structures, correlation
measures have only limited information value when moving away from the normal copula. There
are a number of other indicators of a copula’s ability to generate dependence (see Trivedi and
Zimmer, 2007, for a detailed discussion). One is the question whether it can reach the Fre´chet
upper and lower bounds. The Fre´chet upper bound for any bivariate distribution is given by
Fu(y1, y2) = min[F1(y1), F2(y2)], where F1 and F2 are the marginal cdfs. F (y1, y2) = Fu requires
F to be the most positive dependent bivariate distribution in any possible sense. The lower bound
is given by Fl(y1, y2) = max[0, F1(y1) + F2(y2) − 1], representing greatest possible negative de-
pendence. Both normal and Frank copula can reach Fl and Fu, and thus span the full range of
dependence. For the Frank copula, the dependence parameter may assume any real value. Values
of −∞, 0, and ∞ correspond to the Fre´chet lower bound, independence, and the Fre´chet upper
bound, respectively. Like the normal copula, the Frank copula is symmetric in both tails.
Implementation for ordered response models
For any given copula, the two required joint probabilities, P (y0 = j, s = 0|x, z) and P (y1 = j, s =
1|x, z) in (5) and (6) are fully determined up to the unknown parameters. The assumption of
ordered probit and probit marginals requires that ν ∼ Normal(0, 1), ε1 ∼ Normal(0, 1), ε0 ∼
Normal(0, 1), where the variances are normalized to unity for identification. Thus,
P (y0 = j, s = 0|x, z) = C(Φ(κ0,j − x′β0),Φ(−z′γ), θ0)− C(Φ(κ0,j−1 − x′β0),Φ(−z′γ), θ0) (9)
and
P (y1 = j, s = 1|x, z) = C(Φ(κ1,j − x′β1), 1, θ1)− C(Φ(κ1,j−1 − x′β1), 1, θ1)
− C(Φ(κ1,j − x′β1),Φ(−z′γ), θ1) + C(Φ(κ1,j−1 − x′β1),Φ(−z′γ), θ1) (10)
where C(u, v) is either the normal copula (7), Frank’s copula (8), or the independence copula. The
parameters of the model, ξ = (κ0, κ1, β0, β1, γ, θ0, θ1)′, can be estimated by maximum likelihood, or
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quasi maximum likelihood. Given an independent sample of observation tuples (yi, si, xi, zi), the
likelihood function is simply
L(ξ; y, s, x, z) =
n∏
i=1
P (ys, s|x, z) (11)
In our application, the log likelihood function was maximized using the MAXLIK routine in GAUSS
with numerical first and second derivatives. No convergence problems were encountered. Under
the assumptions of the model, the maximum likelihood estimator has the desirable large sample
properties. If the model is misspecified, it is a quasi-likelihood estimator in the sense of White
(1982), i.e. the best approximation (in a Kullback-Leibler sense) to the true model.
The normal and Frank specifications are non-nested and information criteria can be used to
select among competing models. Alternatively, Vuong (1989) provides a framework for formal
testing. Since the two models are overlapping, both including the independence copula as a special
case, the two-step procedure should be applied.
The estimated ordered probit coefficients have the usual interpretation related to such mod-
els (see, for instance, Boes and Winkelmann, 2006). In particular, they can be used to compute
marginal effects for a randomly selected worker in the two sectors, net of selection bias. A com-
parison of the outcome distribution of a randomly selected worker in the two sectors provides an
estimate of the average treatment effect.
The dependence parameters θs inform about the direction of the selection bias. The null hy-
pothesis of no self-selection implies that θs = 0, a hypothesis that can be tested directly. If rejected,
an interesting quantification of the selection effects can be obtained by comparing the outcome dis-
tribution of self-selected workers, for instance p01 = P (y0 = j|s = 1, x, z), with the counterfactual
predicted distribution p00 = P (y0 = j|s = 0, x, z) of a worker who choses state 1 but is (hypotheti-
cally) allocated to sector 0. For instance, positive selection is defined as a situation where p01 lies
to the right of p00, in the sense that the probability of reporting high levels of job satisfaction in
sector 1 is higher for workers who actually chose that sector, relative to others.
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4 Job satisfaction of Public and Private Sector Workers in Ger-
many
In this section, the copula methodology is applied to a model of sectoral job satisfaction in West
Germany. We distinguish between two sectors, the private sector and the public (or government)
sector. The question of empirical interest in this application is whether sector specific job sat-
isfaction and sector choice are jointly determined. If so, public (and private) sector workers are
not representative of the entire population of workers. As a consequence, estimating a model of
public sector job satisfaction using public sector workers, or of private sector job satisfaction using
private sector workers, does not recover the underlying population relationships. For instance, such
sub-sample estimates would misrepresent the job satisfaction difference between the two sectors for
an average worker. Specifically, we suspect selection based on comparative gain, whereby public
sector workers are those who gain most from that type of work environment, whereas private sector
workers are those whose preferences and values are better matched in private sector jobs.
The selection effects we are interested in are conditional on other observed determinants. The
general latent variable model was formulated in equations (1) and (2) as
y∗s = x
′βs + εs s = 0, 1
where s = 1(z′γ + ν > 0). Moreover, y∗s is the latent job satisfaction index in the private (s = 0)
and public (s = 1) sector, respectively, and x is a vector of explanatory variables that affects job
satisfaction. We estimate all models with two different sets of regressors. In a first model, we
only include worker specific covariates, similar to those found in related papers on the topic of job
satisfaction (e.g. Clark, 1997). In a second model, we add to those worker specific covariates a
set of job specific attributes, such as working hours, wages, and firm size. The two models answer
different questions that both are of independent interest. The second model determines the effect of
working in the public sector on satisfaction conditional on certain job attributes, i.e., for a job in a
similar sized firm, paying the same wage and requiring the same working hours. In the first model,
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these attributes are not kept constant, meaning that the implicit comparison is now one between
the job satisfaction associated with a “typical” job in the public sector and the job satisfaction
associated with a “typical” job in the private sector, that is, mutatis mutandis.
4.1 German Socio-Economic Panel
The data have been extracted from the German Socio-Economic Panel, 2004. We base our analysis
on that particular year because it includes a relatively rich menu of questions that are potentially
related to a person’s preferences for public and private sector employment. These questions were
not included in other years of the survey. Our sample and variable selection follows in part the
prior study of Dustmann and van Soest (1998) who studied self-selection in a model for public and
private sector wages. We focus on male workers and use the same instruments for sector choice as
they did, namely the father’s occupational status (white collar, civil servant) when the worker was
15, as well as the mother’s employment status at that age.
In contrast to Dustmann and van Soest, we do not include the entire working age population
but focus on younger workers, those aged between 25 and 40. The reason is that, when modeling
the effect of preference heterogeneity on choice, one ideally would like to observe these preferences
at the time of choice. Over time, they can change and the interpretation of measured correlations as
being related to self-selection based on preference heterogeneity becomes more and more difficult,
in particular, as many workers are locked in their sector and cannot adjust to preference changes
because switching costs are high. While it might be the case that preferences systematically adapt
in order to rationalize a choice ex-post (e.g. to avoid cognitive dissonance), thus strengthening
measured correlations, they might as well evolve in ways altogether unrelated to the choice. Un-
fortunately, we cannot observe choice-moment preference variables in our data. However, we can
reduce the problem by considering young workers relatively soon after their sector choice at the
beginning of their careers.
Table 1 presents variable definitions and means (with their standard errors in parentheses) for
the sample of 1756 observations, separately by sector. Average job satisfaction is slightly higher
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in the public sector (7.2 relative to 7.1) but the difference is not statistically significant. Private
sector earnings are about 8 percent higher on average, a statistically significant difference.
Among the standard socio-economic controls, AGE, EDUCATION, MARRIED and POOR
HEALTH, only the last deserves additional comment as it is an “objective” measure of poor health,
a caseness score. It is based on the following eight indicators: Frequency (always/often/sometimes
= 1) of strong physical pains; underachievement or limitations at work or during everyday tasks
due to physical health problems; underachievement or limitations due to physical health problems;
social limitations due to impaired health; affect of state of health (greatly/slightly=1) on climbing
stairs; on other tiring everyday tasks.
−−−−−−−−−
Table 1 about here
−−−−−−−−−
In addition, we observe a number of preference indicators regarding risk, social responsibility and
career orientation. In 2004, survey participants were asked about the importance they place on the
following three aspects of life: having a successful career (SUCCESS); helping other people (HELP);
being engaged in social and political activities (ENGAGEMENT). The importance questions were
asked on a four point scale, with responses “unimportant / not very important / important / very
important”, and we define dummy variables taking the value 1 for outcomes “important” or “very
important”. The risk variable is also a self-assessment, measured on an 0-10 scale (“How do you
see yourself: are you a person who is fully prepared to take risks, or do you try to avoid taking
risks?”). Our conjecture was that career oriented individuals and those willing to take higher risks
are more likely to be found in the private sector, whereas individuals who put more importance on
helping and public service tend to be matched to the public sector. From Table 1, however, only
the incidence of ENGAGEMENT differs statistically significantly between the two sectors.
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4.2 Results
A total of six models were estimated, two each using the independence copula, the normal copula,
and the Frank copula, respectively. In Model 1, the regressors in the outcome equation include
GERMAN, MARRIED, EDUCATION, AGE, POOR HEALTH, HELP, SUCCESS, ENGAGE-
MENT, and RISK. The selection equation includes the same variables plus three instruments,
FATHER WHITE COLLAR, FATHER CIVIL SERVANT, MOTHER EMPLOYED, all dummy
variables. In Model 2, five job specific attributes were added, namely MEDIUM FIRM, LARGE
FIRM, WORKING HOURS, OVERTIME, LOG EARNINGS.
Table 2 shows the log-likelihood values and the correlation parameters for these models. There
is clear evidence against the null hypothesis of random selection of workers into the two sectors.
There are four possible comparisons, independence against normal copula and independence against
Frank copula, for Model 1 and Model 2. A likelihood ratio test rejects the independence model in all
four cases. The test statistic varies between 7.6 and 12.0, with critical 5% value for 2 restrictions of
5.99. A likelihood comparison of the normal copula and the Frank copula favors the latter, although
the difference is just 0.7 in Model 1 and 1.2 in Model 2. The horizontal comparison between Model
1 and Model 2 shows that the job attributes are jointly significant indeed. However, as pointed
out earlier, the comparison between Model 1 and Model 2 should be made based on the type of
interpretation one wants to attach to the public/private sector comparison rather than on statistical
grounds.
−−−−−−−−−
Table 2 about here
−−−−−−−−−
Substantively, the two models agree with regards to self selection patterns. The nature of the
selection process can be inferred from the estimates of ρ1, ρ0, θ1 and θ0. Recall that ρ1 and θ1
model dependence between sector choice and public sector job satisfaction, whereas ρ0 and θ0 model
dependence between sector choice and private sector job satisfaction. In both Frank and normal
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copula, negative values indicate that the two random variables, εs and ν, for s = 0, 1, tend to move
in opposite direction. A value of zero represents independence, while positive values arise from
comovements.
From Table 2, one cannot reject that selection into the public sector is independent of public
sector job satisfaction, meaning that the job satisfaction distribution of those who work in the
public sector does not differ from the distribution of an arbitrary worker with the same observed
characteristics. On the other hand, the private sector selection parameters ρ0 and θ0 are negative
and significant. The Spearman rank correlations implied by the estimates for θ0 are -0.62 in Model
1, and -0.67 in Model 2, respectively. The negative correlations mean that the private sector
counterfactual job satisfaction of those who actually opted for the public sector is below that of an
average worker. Taken together, these two observations provide some evidence of “optimal” self-
selection based on unobservables: By working in the public sector, public sector types are better
off, since they avoid the below average job satisfaction they would receive from a private sector job.
Table 3 contains the regression coefficients for the Normal and Frank copula estimates of Model
2. The first three columns show the estimated regression parameters for the Normal copula (public
sector job satisfaction, private sector equation, and selection equation). The estimated parameters
for the Frank copula follow in the next three columns. The threshold parameters are available on
request.
The most conspicuous aspect of Table 3 is the stability of the estimates across specification,
corroborating the similarity of the normal and Frank results found in Table 2. Differences between
the normal and the Frank regression parameters are small and often restricted to the second or third
decimal place. The additional gain from having introduced the copula framework, for this particular
application, is thus primarily the insight that the results are robust to modeling dependence by
either a normal or Frank copula, which was not to be expected ex ante.
As to the substantive results, we find significant positive effects of being German, being not
married and having a higher education on the probability of working in the public sector. Moreover,
those who find it important or very important to show civic engagement are more likely to work in
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the public sector. As typically found in the literature, the job satisfaction index is u-shaped in age
(ceteris paribus, controlling for health and other factors that also vary with age) and poor health
reduces job satisfaction.
Sector specific differences are found for earnings, education, overtime work and marital status.
The point estimates for the effect of earnings on job satisfaction is positive in both sectors, but
the effect is almost twice as large, and statistically significant only, in the private sector. Job
satisfaction falls with years of formal education in the private sector, while working over time hours
has a significant negative effect on job satisfaction only in the public sector.
−−−−−−−−−
Table 3 about here
−−−−−−−−−
To obtain a sense for the magnitude of these effects, one could convert the implied index
changes into changes in predicted probabilities. An alternative, and much simpler, possibility for
interpreting the coefficients is to look at relative magnitudes, i.e. at trade-off ratios. For example,
the estimated coefficient of being married in the private sector is of opposite sign and about 2/3 of
the absolute value of the health coefficient. Thus, being married rather than single compensates (in
the sense of keeping the job satisfaction distribution unchanged) for a 2/3 point (or 1/3 standard
deviation) increase in the health caseness score, reflecting the substantial importance of health for
job satisfaction.
5 Conclusions
The methodological developments in the paper were motivated by a substantive issue related to job
satisfaction. Job satisfaction is an important economic outcome. More satisfied workers are less
likely to quit. Among older workers, those who are more content with work are less likely to retire.
In this paper, we have proposed to study the determinants of job satisfaction using a new
class of ordered probit models with self selection. The class has two main features: First, it
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preserves marginal probit distributions for the ordered outcome and binary selection models, and
thus generalizes the standard econometric model without self-selection. Second, it accounts for
the joint determination of outcome and selection in a simple, yet flexible parametric framework.
Thus, implementation of these methods does not require any estimation and inferential methods
beyond those of maximum likelihood. In this sense, our paper offers an alternative to other recent
implementations of switching regression models for ordered responses based on joint normality
(DeVaro, 2006, Munkin and Trivedi, 2008).
Using a sample of young German men from the German Socio Economic Panel, we could reject
the null-hypothesis of independence between job satisfaction and sector choice. In particular, we
found evidence of “optimal” self-selection based on unobservables: By working in the public sector,
public sector types are better off, since they avoid the below average job satisfaction they would
receive from a private sector job. It turned out that the conclusions were robust to the choice of
copula, as long as dependence was allowed for. From a computational point of view, the model based
on the Frank copula avoids numerical integration and is easier to maximize. In our applications,
computation time was cut by about two thirds.
Ordered response models with endogenous switching, as discussed in this paper, have appli-
cations in many other areas of empirical economics. Future research should pursue some obvious
extensions of these methods, including an integration of additional copula functions beyond the
three considered in this paper, and more general, multinomial selection mechanisms. In subjective
well-being research, the endogeneity of choice variables should be addressed more carefully. The
methods proposed in this paper provide a framework for doing so.
16
References
Asiedu, K.F. and H. Folmer (2007) “Does Privatization Improve Job Satisfaction? The Case of
Ghana”, World Development, 35, 1779-1795.
Boes, S. and R. Winkelmann (2006) “Ordered Response Models”, Advances in Statistical Analysis,
90(1), 165-180.
Clark, A. (1997) “Job Satisfaction and Gender: Why are Women so Happy at Work?”, Labour
Economics, 4, 341-372.
Dustmann, C. and Van Soest, A. (1998) “Public and private sector wages of male workers in
Germany”, European Economic Review, 42, 1417-1441.
Frey, Bruno S. and Alois Stutzer (2002) “What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Research?”,
Journal of Economic Literature, 40(2), 402-435.
Greene, W.H. and D.A. Hensher (2008) Modeling Ordered Choices: A Primer and Recent Devel-
opments, Dep of Economics Working Paper No 08-26, Stern School of Business.
Heywood, J.S., Siebert, W.S., Wei, X. (2002) “Worker sorting and job satisfaction: the case of
union and government jobs”, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 55, 596-610.
Lee, L.-F. (1978) “Unionism and Wage Rates: A Simultaneous Equations Model with Qualitative
and Limited Dependent Variables”, International Economic Review, 19, 415-433.
McCausland, W.D. , K. Pouliakas and I. Theodossiou (2005) “Some are punished and some are
rewarded: A study of the impact of performance pay on job satisfaction”, International
Journal of Manpower, 26, 636-659.
McKelvey, R.D. and Zavoina, W. (1975) “A statistical model for the analysis of ordinal level
dependent variables”, Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 4, 103-120.
17
Munkin, M.K. and Trivedi, P.K. (2008) “Bayesian Analysis of the Ordered Probit Model with
Endogenous Selection”, Journal of Econometrics, 143, 334-348.
Nelson, R.B. (2006) An Introduction to Copulas, Springer, Berlin.
Pederson, P.J., J.B. Schmidt-Sorensen, N. Smith, and N. Westergard-Nielsen (1990) Wage differ-
entials between the public and private sectors, Journal of Public Economics, 41, 125-145.
Sklar, A. (1959) “Fonctions de re´partition a` n dimensions et leurs marges”, Publications de
l’Institut de Statistique de L’Universite´ de Paris, 8, 229-231.
Smith M.D. (2003) “Modeling sample selection using Archimedean copulas”, Econometrics Jour-
nal, 6, 99-123.
Smith M.D. (2005) “Using Copulas to Model Switching Regimes with an Application to Child
Labour”, The Economic Record, 81, S47-S57.
Trivedi, P.K and Zimmer, D.M. (2007) “Copula Modeling: An Introduction for Practitioners”,
Foundations and Trends in Econometrics, Volume 1, Issue 1.
van der Gaag, J. and Vijverberg, W.P.M. (1988) “A Switching Regression Model for Wage Deter-
minants in the Public and Private Sectors of a Developing Country”, Review of Economics
and Statistics, 70, 244-252.
van Ophem, H. (1999) “A General Method To Estimate Correlated Discrete Random Variables”,
Econometric Theory, 15, 228-237.
van Ophem, H. (2000), “Modeling selectivity in count data models”, Journal of Business and
Economic Statistics 18, 503 - 511.
Vella, F. (1998) “Estimating Models with Sample Selection Bias: A Survey.” Journal of Human
Resources, 33(1), 127-172.
18
Vuong, Q.H. (1989) “Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection and Non-Nested Hypothesis”,
Econometrica, 57(2), 307-333.
White, H. (1982) Maximum likelihood estimation of misspecified models, Econometrica 50, 125.
Zimmer, D.M. and Trivedi, P.K. (2006) “Using Trivariate Copulas to Model Sample Selection and
Treatment Effects: Application to Family Health Care Demand”, Journal of Business and
Economic Statistics, 24, 63-76.
Zweimu¨ller, J. and R.Winter-Ebmer (1994) “Gender Wage Differentials in Private and Public
Sector Jobs”, Journal of Population Economics 7, 271-285.
19
Table 1: Variable definitions and means by sector
Variable Definition mean (std.err)
Public Private
JOB SATISFACTION Coded on a 0,1,...,10 scale. 7.208 7.135
(0.107) (0.051)
GERMAN Citizenship (Yes=1) 0.952 0.865
(0.012) (0.009)
MARRIED Marital Status (Yes=1) 0.502 0.584
(0.028) (0.013)
MEDIUM FIRM Firm has more than 100 workers 0.356 0.294
(0.026) (0.012)
LARGE FIRM Firm has more than 2000 workers 0.450 0.225
(0.027) (0.011)
EDUCATION Years of formal schooling 13.4 12.4
(0.155) (0.071)
WORKING HOURS Weekly regular hours 42.7 44.1
(0.489) (0.253)
OVERTIME Weekly overtime hours 2.889 2.7
(0.248) (0.106)
LOG EARNINGS Logarithm of current monthly gross 7.809 7.884
labor income (in Euro) (0.030) (0.015)
AGE Age, in years 34.2 34.2
(0.242) (0.114)
POOR HEALTH A caseness score between 0 (perfect 1.269 1.242
health) and 8 (poor health) (0.106) (0.051)
HELP Importance of being there for others 0.894 0.914
(very important/important=1) (0.017) (0.007)
SUCCESS Importance of being successful in ones 0.792 0.806
career (very important/important=1) (0.022) (0.010)
ENGAGEMENT Importance of political and social 0.353 0.234
engagement (very important/important=1) (0.026) (0.011)
RISK Willingness to take risks (0 = “none”; 5.314 5.333
10 = “full”) (0.117) (0.056)
F. WHITE COLLAR Occupational status of father at age 15 0.251 0.215
(0.024) (0.011)
F. CIVIL SERVANT “ 0.178 0.072
(0.021) (0.007)
M. EMPLOYED Employment status of mother at age 15 0.239 0.242
(0.023) (0.011)
OBSERVATIONS 331 1425
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Table 2. Log-likelihood and estimated dependence parameters
Copula Model 1 Model 2
Independence
log likelihood -4084.8 -4069.3
Normal
ρ1 0.3191 0.3094
(0.422) (0.435)
ρ0 -0.6842 -0.7133
(0.129) (0.114)
log likelihood -4081.0 -4064.5
Frank
θ1 -1.1381 -0.9485
(2.119) (2.127)
θ0 -5.0381 -5.7781
(1.693) (1.691)
log likelihood -4080.3 -4063.3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses;
Job specific attributes are excluded in Model 1 but included in Model 2.
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Table 3. Self-Selection Ordered Probit Models of Sector-Specific Job Satisfaction (German Socio-
Economic Panel 2004, N=1756)
Normal copula Frank copula
Public Private Selection Public Private Selection
MEDIUM FIRM 0.0595 0.0390 0.0604 0.0335
(0.160) (0.060) (0.156) (0.058)
LARGE FIRM 0.0329 -0.0037 0.0261 0.0001
(0.160) (0.069) (0.160) (0.068)
WORKING HOURS 0.0071 0.0001 0.0076 0.0000
(0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003)
OVERTIME -0.0285* 0.0018 -0.0283* 0.0033
(0.017) (0.007) (0.017) (0.007)
LOG EARNINGS 0.1467 0.2531* 0.1275 0.2406*
(0.140) (0.055) (0.139) (0.055)
GERMAN -0.0882 0.1253 0.4174* 0.0788 0.1150 0.4047*
(0.328) (0.085) (0.139) (0.371) (0.086) (0.140)
MARRIED -0.0493 0.1181* -0.1497* -0.0717 0.1136* -0.1484*
(0.143) (0.062) (0.079) (0.148) (0.060) (0.080)
EDUCATION 0.0036 -0.0313* 0.0554* 0.0241 -0.0293* 0.0550*
(0.026) (0.011) (0.014) (0.032) (0.011) (0.014)
AGE -0.3510 -0.2490* -0.0949 -0.3857* -0.2614* -0.1004
(0.225) (0.105) (0.135) (2.204) (1.036) (1.364)
AGE SQUARED 0.5008 0.3640* 0.1452 0.5562* 0.3837* 0.1519
(0.338) (0.158) (0.203) (0.331) (0.155) (0.204)
POOR HEALTH -0.1739* -0.1675* 0.0158 -0.1667* -0.1623* 0.0199
(0.034) (0.016) (0.020) (0.039) (0.017) (0.020)
HELP 0.3139 0.2104* -0.1009 0.2950 0.2163* -0.1104
(0.214) (0.094) (0.118) (0.224) (0.091) (0.120)
SUCCESS 0.1550 0.0989 -0.1155 0.0927 0.0792 -0.1226
(0.146) (0.073) (0.098) (0.153) (0.073) (0.100)
ENGAGEMENT -0.0192 -0.0055 0.2587* 0.0643 -0.0138 0.2759*
(0.140) (0.067) (0.081) (0.154) (0.065) (0.081)
RISK -0.0047 0.0200 -0.0124 -0.0074 0.0203* -0.0119
(0.033) (0.012) (0.018) (0.031) (0.012) (0.018)
F. WHITE COLLAR 0.0865 0.0721
(0.083) (0.085)
F. CIVIL SERVANT 0.4935* 0.4900*
(0.109) (0.110)
M. EMPLOYED -0.1246 -0.1365*
(0.078) (0.079)
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